Lessons from non-precedential appeals

I've blogged previously about the Court of Appeal's innovative use of catchwords to declare that a case raises no point of principle (see here and here). Recently, Ashley and Weinberg JJA released another batch of decisions with the "no point of principle" catchword. One of them, however, arguably does raise a (minor) point of principle and so raises the question of how later courts should treat it. In Harper v R [2011] VSCA 314, the offender was a Thai national who attempted to smuggle over 100g of heroin into Australia, concealed in body cavities. During the sentencing remarks, the judge stated:

By resorting to internal concealment of the drugs, you made detection of the offence even more difficult. This is an aggravating feature of your crime.

Although there was no ground of specific error, Ashley JA at [22] took the time to comment that:

Counsel for the Crown did not submit today that this was a correct statement of principle. In my opinion, it was not. It is at the heart of the particular offence that detection of the drugs will be made as difficult as possible. So to say does not mean that what I regard as a manifestly excessive sentence is to be explained by the judge’s particular observation. Rather, I take the opportunity to indicate my opinion that the observation was unsound.

Bearing in mind what the Court said in Ciantar & Rose, should judges give any weight to this statement, or should they treat it as wholly irrelevant? Is there a difference between a case that raises "no point of principle" and one that is "without precedent value"? Indeed, if there is a later case where a judge again treats the manner of concealment as an aggravating factor for importation, would the court reprimand counsel for referring to Harper in an argument that this constituted specific error? These are a couple of questions that are thrown up when, despite declaring that a case raises no point of principle, the court makes statements on important general issues, such as whether or not something is an aggravating factor.

One wrong leads to another

One sentencing principle that regularly makes an appearance in appellate judgments is that of parity, which states that it is appealable error where the sentences between co-offenders are so different (or not different enough) as to create a "justifiable sense of grievance". Where all co-offenders are sentenced at the one time, parity arguments seem to me to have particular potency, as it indicates that a single judge has failed to adopt a consistent approach to sentencing co-offenders, or alternatively, has failed to recognise the significant differences between the sentences that are appropriate for different co-offenders. But parity is not only relevant when all co-offenders are sentenced at once. It applies equally, though with more difficulty, when several co-offenders are sentenced by separate judges.

Recently though, courts have grappled with the question of how to deal with a parity ground of appeal when the comparison sentence is inadequate and the offender received an appropriate disposition. Can an offender be said to have a justifiable sense of grievance for not receiving a manifestly inadequate sentence, such as the one his co-offender received? Regrettably, the answer is yes.

The not-so-unfettered discretion

Some days, I just can't help but feel sorry for Parliamentary drafters. Take a reasonably simple provision like s669A of the Criminal Code (Queensland):

(1) The Attorney-General may appeal to the Court against any sentence pronounced by--

(a) the court of trial; or

(b) a court of summary jurisdiction in a case where an indictable offence is dealt with summarily by that court;

and the Court may in its unfettered discretion vary the sentence and impose such sentence as to the Court seems proper.

When Parliamentary Counsel wrote that provision, what sort of fetters do you think he or she intended would apply to the Court's ability to vary the sentence and impose such sentence as seemed proper?

In Lacey v AG [2011] HCA 10, a 6-1 majority of the High Court (Heydon J dissenting) settled on the word "appeal" in the opening words to hold that, like other appeals, the appellate court could not interfere unless it first determined error in the original sentence.

Lies and videotapes

For several years, consciousness of guilt has posed serious problems for Victorian trial judges. While the theory behind consciousness of guilt is arguably just common sense (a person who lies about important matters or engages in other incriminating conduct, like attempting to flee the State after an alleged offence may be more likely to be guilty of that offence) the reasons for the problems numerous and arguably a predictable result of the current state of the law:

• The directions required are long and complex, requiring precise identification of each separate piece of evidence and requires the judge to suggest other explanations for the lie or other evidence.
• The Court of Appeal has been incredibly vigilant for the slightest slip
• Prosecutors, concerned about the directions leaving the jury confused or considering the issue too hard and just setting the evidence to one side, may eschew reliance on consciousness of guilt reasoning
• Defendants, concerned that extensive directions on the topic would give it unwarranted prominence, encourage prosecutors and judges to eschew reliance on full consciousness of guilt directions

Johnstone v R [2011] VSCA 60 is then merely the latest in the long line of cases where consciousness of guilt evidence has brought a trial undone.

New Criminal Appeal rules

The Court of Appeal has released a new practice statement on criminal appeals, following amendments to Chapter VI of the Supreme Court Rules. These amendments follow what seemed to be a short consultation process in the last weeks of December last year.

Dangerous delays

Applicants for special leave to appeal to the High Court are well familiar with three standard bases on which special leave is refused:

1. The case does not raise any issue of sufficient importance
2. The case does not have sufficient prospects of success
3. The case is not a suitable vehicle for raising the issue in question

So far, one striking feature of the French High Court has been its increasingly aggressive position on the issue of court delays. As a result, we may start to see the emergence of a fourth basis:

• The delays in the case have been too great to justify further extending proceedings

Abolition of sentencing double jeopardy

One of the major reforms introduced by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 was the abolition of the sentencing principle of double jeopardy. This principle historically acted as a fetter on Crown appeals against sentence and, in the words of the then-Attorney General:

This existing common-law consideration can distort sentencing practices because the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal will not reflect the sentence that it considers should have been imposed in the first place. This can reduce the guidance provided by Court of Appeal sentences to other courts and the effectiveness of DPP appeals against sentence.

Further, this approach does not take into account other relevant and counterbalancing policy considerations, such as the interests of the community and the victim, in the courts sentencing offenders to appropriate sentences.

In DPP v Karazisis, Bogtstra and Kontoklotsis, specially convened court of five considered the operation of ss287, 289 and 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.

The meaning of 'sentence'

Ludeman, Thomas & French v R is the first five-judge bench decision on the meaning of the new appeal provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The court held that the right to appeal 'a sentence' and the provisions governing when the court may grant leave or allow the appeal, apply to:

• The recording of a conviction;
• The individual sentences;
• Any concurrency or cumulation orders associated with individual sentences; 
• The non-parole period;
• An aggregate sentence;
• Superannuation orders;
• Restitution orders; and
• Compensation orders.

However, the provisions do not apply to what is conventionally called the 'total effective sentence'.

Corporate identity, statutory interpretation and keywords

Monday 29 November 2010 has been a busy day for Victorians. After a long wait, John Brumby conceded defeat in the Victorian state election. However, while politics tragics may have been waiting most of the day with bated breath, criminal law geeks received a feast of decisions from the Court of Appeal. Three in particular deserve special mention.

The limited value of specified sentence discounts

In Sharkey v R [2010] VSCA 273, one of the recent flurry of non-precedential appeals, Ashely JA remarked that

... this is yet another instance in which, despite an early plea of guilty and accepted remorse, a sentencing judge made a s 6AAA declaration which reveals, on its face, a minimal discount in the sentence passed in recognition of the plea. The revealed discount is indicative sentencing error. But it is unnecessary to decide whether, on that account alone, the sentencing discretion should be re-opened; because the respondent accepts that the sentence passed on the count of armed robbery was outside the range.

In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Scerri v R [2010] VSCA 287, the Court rejected a ground of appeal that the judge erred by imposing a discount of only 20% for a plea of guilty. The Court stated (footnotes omitted):

Appeals without precedent

Yesterday was a busy day for the Court of Appeal. Ashley and Weinberg JJA handed down 4 separate sentence appeal decisions, all of which contained the following peculiar catchword

Appeal decision without precedent value

The decisions were all highly fact-based, though Dow v R [2010] VSCA 274 and Sharkey v R [2010] VSCA 273 both adverted to the issue of how declarations of guilty plea discount can be used as a ground of appeal.

The human cost of appeals and the limits of judicial review

Last week, Justice Ross handed down his decision in Priest v West, the first Victorian Supreme Court decision reviewing a coroner's decision on the application of s57 of the Coroners Act 2008. That provision, which is closely modelled on s128 of the Uniform Evidence Act, preserves the privilege against self-incrimination in coronial inquests, but allows coroners to override the privilege while providing the witness with a certificate that guarantees use immunity and derivative use immunity to the evidence.

Adjournments and alternatives

Four days before a scheduled hearing to give evidence as primary prosecution witness in a road rage incident, Ms Venner was admitted to hospital for emergency surgery. Dutifully, she notified the informant that she would not be available, who then, one day before the hearing, notified the defendant that the police would apply for an adjournment and, in the alternative, would apply under s65 of the Evidence Act for the court to receive her police statement. These are the facts underlying DPP v Easwaralingam.

Surprisingly in those circumstances, the defendant opposed both applications, the Magistrate knocking back the adjournment application because