One sentencing principle that regularly makes an appearance in appellate judgments is that of parity, which states that it is appealable error where the sentences between co-offenders are so different (or not different enough) as to create a "justifiable sense of grievance". Where all co-offenders are sentenced at the one time, parity arguments seem to me to have particular potency, as it indicates that a single judge has failed to adopt a consistent approach to sentencing co-offenders, or alternatively, has failed to recognise the significant differences between the sentences that are appropriate for different co-offenders. But parity is not only relevant when all co-offenders are sentenced at once. It applies equally, though with more difficulty, when several co-offenders are sentenced by separate judges.
Recently though, courts have grappled with the question of how to deal with a parity ground of appeal when the comparison sentence is inadequate and the offender received an appropriate disposition. Can an offender be said to have a justifiable sense of grievance for not receiving a manifestly inadequate sentence, such as the one his co-offender received? Regrettably, the answer is yes.