The new proviso - Just like the old one

One of the reforms introduced by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 was a change to the structure of what had previously been standard form criminal appeal grounds. The old statute required an appellant on a conviction appeal to establish one of three things:

• That the verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by evidence;
• That there was a wrong decision on a question of law; or
• That on any other basis there was a miscarriage of justice.

These three grounds were then qualified by the proviso that the appeal would not be allowed if the prosecution showed that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. Under the new Act, the proviso was folded into the substantive appeal grounds, so that the court must allow the appeal if and only if:

(a) the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; or
(b) as the result of an error or an irregularity in, or in relation to, the trial there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice; or
(c) for any other reason there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Special leave update - September 2011

Before wading through the 273 pages of Momcilovic, it's worth having a brief look at the latest additions to the High Court's workload. Back on the 2nd of September, the High Court granted special leave in four criminal cases - 3 from Victoria and 1 from New South Wales.

New Criminal Appeal rules

The Court of Appeal has released a new practice statement on criminal appeals, following amendments to Chapter VI of the Supreme Court Rules. These amendments follow what seemed to be a short consultation process in the last weeks of December last year.

Abolition of sentencing double jeopardy

One of the major reforms introduced by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 was the abolition of the sentencing principle of double jeopardy. This principle historically acted as a fetter on Crown appeals against sentence and, in the words of the then-Attorney General:

This existing common-law consideration can distort sentencing practices because the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal will not reflect the sentence that it considers should have been imposed in the first place. This can reduce the guidance provided by Court of Appeal sentences to other courts and the effectiveness of DPP appeals against sentence.

Further, this approach does not take into account other relevant and counterbalancing policy considerations, such as the interests of the community and the victim, in the courts sentencing offenders to appropriate sentences.

In DPP v Karazisis, Bogtstra and Kontoklotsis, specially convened court of five considered the operation of ss287, 289 and 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.

The meaning of 'sentence'

Ludeman, Thomas & French v R is the first five-judge bench decision on the meaning of the new appeal provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The court held that the right to appeal 'a sentence' and the provisions governing when the court may grant leave or allow the appeal, apply to:

• The recording of a conviction;
• The individual sentences;
• Any concurrency or cumulation orders associated with individual sentences; 
• The non-parole period;
• An aggregate sentence;
• Superannuation orders;
• Restitution orders; and
• Compensation orders.

However, the provisions do not apply to what is conventionally called the 'total effective sentence'.

The limited value of specified sentence discounts

In Sharkey v R [2010] VSCA 273, one of the recent flurry of non-precedential appeals, Ashely JA remarked that

... this is yet another instance in which, despite an early plea of guilty and accepted remorse, a sentencing judge made a s 6AAA declaration which reveals, on its face, a minimal discount in the sentence passed in recognition of the plea. The revealed discount is indicative sentencing error. But it is unnecessary to decide whether, on that account alone, the sentencing discretion should be re-opened; because the respondent accepts that the sentence passed on the count of armed robbery was outside the range.

In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Scerri v R [2010] VSCA 287, the Court rejected a ground of appeal that the judge erred by imposing a discount of only 20% for a plea of guilty. The Court stated (footnotes omitted):